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Contracts, Relationships and Innovation in Business-
to-Business Exchanges  
Structured Abstract:  
 
Purpose 
This paper contrasts two approaches to the study of contracts in business and 
industrial marketing: First, as a legal document in shaping at the outset exchanges and 
interactions, for instance in projects; and Second, as relational norms in becoming 
integrated into a business relationship through interactions, for instance as a resource. 
Approach 
The paper draws on cross-case comparison of three projects as actors develop an 
engineering service for optimising the maintenance of large-scale capital equipment 
by analysing data acquired from user records and in real time from sensors. 
Comparison is by coding interview and observational data as micro-sequences of 
interactions among actors. 
Findings 
Preparing contracts allows a project to commence and is an early form of interaction, 
intensifying new relationships, or cutting into and recasting established ones. 
Relational norms augment and can supersede the early focus on the contract, so 
incorporating incremental innovation and absorbing some uncertainties. 
Limitations 
The research approach benefits from detailed comparison and captures some variety 
across its three cases, but our discussion is limited to theoretical generalization. 
Practical Implications 
Our analysis and discussion highlights and focuses on when different approaches to 
understanding contracting are more apparent across durable business relationships. 
Transitions from a contractual document to a view of relational norms are subtle, 
vulnerable and not always made successfully. 
Originality 
This paper’s originality is in it comparison of overlapping approaches to 
understanding businesses’ uses of contacts in business and industrial marketing, of 
contract and relational norms. It develops a valuable research proposition, in the 
transition from a mainly contractual to a mainly relational uses of contracts, so 
identifying contract as a particular business resource, to be deployed and embedded. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Actors encounter and mobilize contracts regularly in industrial markets, but contracts, 
in contrast to incremental innovation and product and service development, have been 
less prominent in empirical research and less conceptualized.  Incremental innovation 
is a long-established theme in IMP research, captured in its network framing 
(Prenkert, et al. 2009; Hoholm and Araujo, 2011), focus on interaction (Håkansson 
and Snehota, 1995), interactive model of actors, resources and activities (Harrison and 
Waluszewski, 2008), and its resource interaction model (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 
2002; Baraldi and Waluszewski, 2005; Baraldi, et al., 2012).   
 
Researchers have proposed two approaches for incorporating contracts into this 
research agenda:  Blois (2002) and Ivens and Blois (2004) have investigated the 
commonalities and extensions to the concept of relationship through Macneil’s theory 
of relational contract, focusing on contracts in use (Macneil and Campbell, 2001).  
Mouzas and Ford (2012) and Mouzas and Blois (2013) argue that a contract can be a 
meta-resource, which can enable business relationships, for instance as framework or 
umbrella agreements.  Hence, we identify contrasting perspectives on actors' uses of 
contracts: in framing business activities in advance; and as drawn into business 
relationships, perhaps to be superseded by a set of relational norms as these emerge.  
 
The paper draws on case study research into three projects in which actors in business 
units developed industrial services to optimize the maintenance of large-scale 
processing and manufacturing plant.  Actors used these services in “beta version” 
prior to an anticipated commercialization. Given our expectations as to the adaptive 
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quality of resources, including intermediate goods and services, and a focus on 
incremental innovation organized through projects, we anticipated that tensions would 
emerge in practice. We found careful transformations between contracts as developed 
prior to a business project, and as contracts were drawn into an emerging set of 
relational norms during projects.   
 
2. Contracts in Industrial and Business-to-Business Marketing 
Research 
 
2.1 Incremental innovation and resources 
Research into business-to-business relationships and exchanges show that resources - 
business units, relationships between the personnel of business units, production 
facilities, or intermediate goods and services - typically develop in use through many-
to-many interactions (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002; Cova and Salle, 2008).  A 
focus on resources blurs distinctions between autonomous, emerging and planned 
innovation, of actors adapting to another’s modifications in use or production and 
planning projects, raising significant challenges for contracting in incremental 
innovation (Westerlund and Rajala, 2010).   
 
Srai and Gregory (2008: 394) describe as  “re-configurability” the temporal nature of 
an industrial network, allowing business goods and services to be linked, decoupled 
and rearranged according to the interactions among producers and users. Many actors 
contribute to the development of resources through a complex of user-patterns as 
accumulations of adaptations, perhaps within a particular focal relationship but 
emanating from or augmented by activities elsewhere in a network (Cantù, et al., 
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2012; Finch, et al., 2012; Gadde, et al., 2012).  This finding is also established in 
management studies research into inter-organizational and network relationships 
(Björk and Magnusson, 2009; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Rampersad, et al., 2010; 
von Hippel, 2007).   
 
2.2 Contracts considered prior to episodes of business interaction  
Contracts are under-researched in business-to-business marketing, which is 
remarkable given their ubiquity in practice.  This may be due to contracts being often 
in the background of the more prominent research areas of relationships and 
interaction.  Two approaches into incorporating contracts have gained prominence. 
Blois (2002), Blois and Ivens (2007, 2009) and Harrison (2004) develop Macneil’s 
relational theory of contract (Macneil and Campbell, 2001), addressing how the social 
properties of relationships make contracts work.  By contrast, Mouzas and Ford 
(2012) argued that contracts can be a meta-resource, with those party to industrial 
exchanges being more or less effective in drawing upon these to establish 
relationships and  exchanges.  As such, actors can use contracts to articulate their 
goals and ways of aligning these (Corsaro and Snehota, 2011).  
 
Following Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1985) contracts allow actors 
to allocate resources by securing and transferring their property rights (Araujo, et al., 
2003).  Coase (1937, p. 21) highlights the active shaping of resources as integral to 
their allocation and contractual fulfillment. Even without written contracts, processes 
can acquire legal standing.  For example, in long-standing exchanges the German 
principle “auf Treu und Glauben” or “bona fide”  binds actors to tacit agreements, 
which have acquired a facticity by virtue of their longevity (Teubner, 2001).  
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Macauley (1963) acknowledged the need for “good faith” in business contracting, 
arguing that “many, if not most, exchanges reflect no planning, or only a minimal 
amount of it, especially concerning legal sanctions and the effect of defective 
performances” (Macaulay, 1963:60).  Similarly, Goetz and Scott (1983) recognized 
contracts' promissory elements inherent in their performance and fulfillment, 
expecting actors joined by a contract to interact across a succession of exchanges, 
enhancing their prospects of coping with endemic uncertainty.  
 
Formal contracts can lose their  initial impetus or prove to be impracticable as 
business relationships develop (Posner and Rosenfield, 1977:85).  Instead, if actors 
experience difficulties in mobilizing resources in conditions of embeddedness, 
“relational costs” as a recurrent need for re-negotiations of formal contracts remain 
high (Corsaro and Snehota, 2012; Roels, et al., 2010). The pursuit of incremental 
innovation poses a risk to contract enforcement (Lerch, et al., 2010). A contract could 
be supplemented by the exertion of power (Zaefarian, et al., 2013) or require a 
controlling of business exchanges, for instance as projects (Yang et al., 2011).  
 
2.3 Contracts, drawn into business relationships  
Macneil (2000, 2002) includes social balance as a “relational contract” in which 
actors seek justice with relational contributions in addition to contractual obligations.  
Blois (2002), Blois and Ivens (2006, 2007) and Ivens and Blois (2004) applied 
Macneil’s framework, drawing together norms, the atmosphere of exchange, and 
harmonizing the governance of exchange, with “the social matrix” of how actors draw 
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upon ‘living contracts’ over time.  Macneil’s relationship traits capture actors’ role 
integrity, reciprocity, implementation upon planning, solidarity, and the linkage of 
interests. The behavioural norms include the restraint given any unforeseen changes, 
which would offer chances for opportunism (Whetten, 1982). Consequently, Macneil 
highlights the “extensive, long-term relationships ... as a distinctive form of 
contracting” Feinman (2000) and the “implied contract” (Harrison, 2004).  
 
Researchers have proposed ways of analyzing patterns of interaction.  Quintens and 
Matthyssens (2010) find that actors construe their embeddedness by duration, 
sequence and pace. Ramos and Ford (2011) develop temporal criteria to assess the 
intentionality of actors within dyadic relationships, sharing resources and attempts at 
creating their network’s past, present and future events. Fang and Chiu (2010) and Gu 
and Wang (2011) emphasize a “virtual community of practice” with altruistic and 
conscientious knowledge sharing. In sum, the effective governance of relationships 
has significant effects on the performance of business relationships (Yang, et al., 
2011).  
 
We summarize the gap to be addressed by asking: 
(1) In business-to-business collaborations directed at incremental innovation, by 
which arrangements are norms and rules of exchange established and maintained? 
(2) As business-to-business collaborations mature, how do arrangements for making 
exchanges change? 
 
 
3.  Research Approach 
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3.1 Case Studies 
As contracts, rules and norms in relationships concern processes, case study 
methodology is appropriate (Van de Ven, 2007). Analytically, we undertook a series of 
abductive cycles across three comparable projects drawn from broader research into 
the development of industrial services studied over three years. We undertook open-
ended interviews with the project leaders, which we recorded audio-visually and 
produced verbatim transcripts, as summarised in Table 1(below).  We asked project 
leaders to sketch a map of their project and drew upon this in identifying other key 
personnel, seeking interviews with them. We participated in workshops, team 
meetings, technical conferences and presentations of prototypes. We composed 
detailed records of meetings and workshops, complemented by email requests where 
we required clarification or background information.  Some of the passages in the 
transcriptions became bases of narratives and we used these as quotations (Pentland, 
1999). 
 
[Please insert Table 1 about here]  
 
3.2 Comparative Cases 
IndSyst, a trans-national corporation specializing in engineering processes and 
automation, had established a global full service division to offer technical support in 
the management of plant, including by using sensors and information processing 
technologies, some in real time. Full service contracts were a profitable business 
stream with the potential for expansion.  To enhance its competitiveness, IndSyst’s 
R&D division had developed a range of services that required deployment and 
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collaboration with customers as ‘fast-beta versions’. We selected three projects, 
similarly innovative and challenging, being incremental from users' perspectives.  In 
two cases the clients were internal customers, and in the other a consortium for a 
joint-industry project. We set out characteristics by which we compared the three 
projects below in Table 2. 
 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3.3 Analytical strategy 
Our dataset comprised several hundred pages of written materials containing multiple 
perspectives of the three projects.  We translated these as case studies with common 
characteristics focusing on the actions, interpretations and understandings of our 
informants (Bartel and Garud, 2009).  We identified events within the projects and 
examine how these were connected prior to, concurrent with, or following-on from 
one another.  The events were micro-sequences of interaction, which we drew upon to 
identify transformational stories (Czarniawska, 2004).  We coded the patterns of 
events and sequences within projects around the themes of product/service, price and 
value.  As we had obtained network sketches from most of the participants, we cross-
referred interviewees’ descriptions (Yakura, 2002, p. 968). We held a series of follow-
up meetings with key respondents to verify our findings. 
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1 The uses of contracts 
The projects were initiated by contracts. Partners met regularly to define the projects’ 
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technical questions, agreeing the technical base and key performance criteria.  As the 
projects contained novel modules, processes and interfaces, technical, legal and 
accounting personnel identified and assessed the projects’ risks. The ensuing 
contractual agreements reconciled visions of project outcomes with the expectations 
across the R&D and full service divisions, and the customers.  
 
The contracts contained detailed synopses of the extent and distribution of workload, 
the estimated cost and its allocation among participants. The contracts established the 
projects’ contingencies operationally, in part by referring to similar past projects. The 
contracts included processes for attributing financial authority and accountability to 
the project leaders, and attributing expenses for financial reporting. Non-disclosure 
agreements were incorporated due to the cross-departmental and inter-organizational 
exchanges required of the projects. The contracts foresaw regular reports of a certain 
format, project milestones with review points, and work packages. IndSyst’s senior 
manager oversaw projects and reflected upon learning about producing contracts for 
projects: 
 
Each time I make a new contract, it becomes longer than the previous one. ... 
You can hope that the project takes off in the right direction, with the help of 
the initial paperwork. But usually, the contract has no other meaning than that. 
 
4.2 The awareness of a project’s resources 
Our respondents were well aware of the resources at their disposal. Discussion of 
resources was translated into measures of financial  outlays and work-time 
equivalents in IndSyst’s accounting system. Project managers anticipated, calculated 
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and recalled their share of the projects’ costs and benefits in quantifiable terms. 
Project 1’s manager was well aware that investing in a project was double-edged: “If I 
invest much money, I am prepared to also make a higher personal commitment 
accordingly. But conversely, I have a much stronger expectation”.  
 
The contracts served as an initial orientation, a basis for committing resources and 
expenditures to be incurred for the potential of a presumed benefit.  Accordingly, 
Project 1’s manager illustrated the balancing of deliberations between the supplier and 
customer:  “This positive commitment is enhanced by the money, but the beneficial 
effect is much more relativized”.  As every activity, software purchase, and all travel 
expenses were recorded and allocated to a project, the administration created the 
awareness of the monetary value of inputs.  
 
4.3 Reflecting on embeddedness 
The contracts clarified the project leaders’ expectations of their respective contractees. 
In Project 2, where a mobilization suite for on-site technicians was to be developed, 
the project leader translated the signed agreements into business objectives: 
 
This is a project with which you can optimize processes, that is basically its 
justification. I would say it is a mixture of an overdue innovation and a 
redesign, albeit not a radical one. 
 
Personnel of IndSyst’s service division incurred considerable effort to apply the 
innovations devised by its R&D group. In Project 2, an on-site technician contributed 
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overtime paid by his own unit to make the pilot run:  
 
As [our business] is customer support around the clock, during the project’s 
start-up I had to be involved personally to solve some technical issues, over 
the night, during holidays and on weekends. 
 
The technician’s contribution had not been anticipated in the contract. A renegotiation 
process was impossible due to that initial contract’s legally binding status. Moreover, 
as such unforeseen eventualities emerged frequently, such changes in would have 
become impracticable as these would have accumulated over the project’s duration. 
Extensions of schedules, changes in functionality and increased dedication of 
personnel had to be negotiated and benefited for actors’ positive attitudes throughout 
Projects 1 and 2.  
 
Where consensus failed, the contract was adhered to as much as possible, as observed 
in Project 3 where the status meetings captured detailed adherence, as in the following 
protocol: 
 
Last year’s alert reports, half-year reports, (project leader thanks for support) 
Controlling data has improved over time; now very accurate 
Communication procedures of pilot project published in company magazine 
 
Resorting to mundane activities indicated a lack of relational development. 
Accordingly, there was progress only  in short-term measures in the sub-projects. 
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These sought to fulfill the lowest common denominator, the parts of the contract that 
had not yet become impracticable. 
 
4.4 Establishing and maintaining balance 
With Project 2, the customer’s site manager took into account the monetary 
equivalents as he did with normal work time for his personnel. This manager had 
already accounted for the quantifiable pay-off in saving resources and the subjective 
benefits of having a tailor-made operations and control suite, as depicted in Table 3. 
 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The sequence (above) shows that the customer’s team manager made calculations to 
measure the use of resources as a share of the project’s inputs. As Project 2 concluded, 
he saw a balance in the monetary benefits of the new service and in the inherent value 
of participation. We recorded similar patterns of reflection and calculation across the 
three projects. Early in Project 2, the customer balanced the current and future costs 
against the anticipated benefits of the project outcome, as illustrated by the sequence 
in Table 4: 
 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The sequence begins with a weighting of priorities, focusing on the deployment of 
resources as to a deliverable and benefit, but shifts towards Project 2’s business 
objectives after determination of the costs to be incurred. Conversely, if the perceived 
balance failed to emerge, project partners’ constructive attitudes did not develop. A 
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similar internal calculation in a later stage of Project 3 – the least successful of the 
three projects – is shown as a sequence in Table 5. 
 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
 
With Project 3, the manager from IndSyst’s service division experienced a negative 
balance from the collaboration. As with the two sequences above, the balance was 
drawn from reflection and calculation of inputs in accounting terms, of having 
resources deployed in the project rather than in other activities, and the development 
of those resources by being deployed in the project. With Project 3, participants 
defined their goals for the project alongside other activities in their organizations, 
enough to keep the project going by reacting to problems, or the pursuit of their goals 
that required minimal resources. We observed the renegotiation of Project 3’s 
common intent; participants drawing upon the lack of precision in the contract as a 
basis for evasive behavior.  Despite similar introductory steps, the three projects 
turned out differently, as illustrated in Table 6: 
 
[Please insert Table 6 around here] 
 
The contract, considered relationally, enabled Project 1’s participants to adjust and 
adapt its goals, reducing its scope, and still assess its outcome as a success. 
Participants experienced fewer surprises with Project 2 and contemplate extending its 
scope and number of deliverables, also redrawing its requirements. With Project 3, a 
renegotiation proved impossible and the common goal was diminished successively 
as participants re-assessed the planned technical developments, seeing these as 
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impractical. The project’s common denominator became, almost, non-fulfillment.  As 
the contracts’ active and governing influence became obsolete in Projects 1 and 2, 
relational contracts gradually assumed the role of ordering and indexing. Failure to 
reach this consensus in Project 3 resulted in project failure. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Contracts as processes and resources prior to and within projects 
The contracts constituted an activity, ordering the initial givens of resources and 
actors and the ways in which they were to be coordinated, anticipating and regulating 
future activities. The activity of writing the contracts promoted contracts as a 
harmonizing device, creating a joint perception of the project’s environment, the 
technological potential, and the desired outcome. The initial negotiations managed to 
anticipate the confidentiality, internal regulation, documentation and reporting 
mechanisms and standards by which an ordered exchange of knowledge, capabilities, 
and technical know-how was enabled.  After signing, these contracts had to remain 
unchanged throughout the projects, mainly for legal reasons. Due to this requirement 
for stability, the contracts became a resource for identifying technologies, resources in 
the partnering organizations, the desired benefits the innovative services, and the 
allocation and interaction of project staff.   
 
Our first research question was: In a rich innovation-directed industrial business-to-
business collaboration, by which static and dynamic reciprocal arrangements are 
common norms and rules established and maintained?  Our answer is that processes 
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of technical, organizational, and financial negotiations initiated the business-to-
business projects, gathered into a formal contract. Contracting was transferred into the 
– now static – normative contract, which acted as a frame for the ensuing 
collaboration.  The contract served as a process and instrument for an initial phase of 
interaction. 
  
5.2 Relational contracts in use  
The adjustments had to be made by a different kind of activity, the formation of the 
relation norms, which in a similar way as the formal contract anticipated the need for 
ordering and circumspection. This mutual and long-term orientation, and emerging 
positive attitudes, were observable in the more successful Projects 1 and 2. We found 
no evidence of actors renegotiating their management practices opportunistically in 
these projects. However, the emphasis on long-term processes and planning 
compensated for the obsolescence of the formal contract by establishing a binding de 
facto agreement for coping with the project’s contingencies. These findings reinforce 
our view of actors' conscientious, sometimes altruistic, long-term mind-set as 
becoming a relational norm. 
 
Contracts became obsolete as a resource for guiding Projects 1 and 2.  After a certain 
period the relational norms exceeded a level of harmonization to ensure the 
continuation of the project and its business exchanges. By establishing sets of norms 
that shaped participants’ attitudes to one another and to a more general understanding 
of the project’s goals, the norms superseded the contract as a resource at least to the 
extent that circumstances anticipated initially had changed. However, there was no 
need to finalize the iterated negotiations in a manner similar to finalizing the initial 
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contract at signature; the emerging norms enabled a continuous adjustment of 
common goals as further unexpected developments became manifest.   
 
Our second research question asked:  As business-to-business collaborations mature, 
how do arrangements for making exchanges change?  Our answer is that the contract 
regulated the initiation phase of the business-to-business collaboration. Its technical 
and organizational details became increasingly obsolete due to unforeseen 
developments and new requirements, which are typical in innovation ventures. A 
normative consent, as a set of relational norms, was installed and ensured an orderly, 
mutually dedicated, atmosphere. Our analyses indicates that particularly the initial 
phases will have a neutral or positive orienting influence, although the coercive nature 
of the project can yield a negative attitude from the start. Transitions towards 
relational norms were characterized by an alignment and the pursuit of a common 
goal, leading to a beneficial performance level.  
 
However, a renewed contracting phase may be induced by a dispute or crisis invoking 
a negative transition phase. As dissent as to the goals to be pursued becomes manifest, 
the contract can be resorted to as a means of appeasement or litigation. This is 
illustrated in Project 3, which saw a divergent perception of the collaborative phases 
by actors, similar to that highlighted by Corsaro and Snehota (2012). In Project 3, 
dissatisfied participants frustrated the emergence of relational norms by reverting to 
the contract, using it as a resource but one that weakened performance. Even though 
IndSyst’s personnel contributed business cases and technical input from the outset, 
there was little reciprocation among the other partners. As a long-term perspective 
could not be achieved and partners’ goals remained incompatible, some partners 
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resorted to pseudo-contributing activities and evasive actions. A legal dispute was 
avoided because the conditions of the contract were fulfilled, but with a mutual loss of 
resources and perspectives.  We summarize the cross-case findings as to the relational 
stages, the pursuit of common goals, and prevailing activities in Table 7. 
 
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
6.1 Contribution to theory  
Blois and Ivens (2007) consider Macneil’s terms of “implementation” and 
“effectuation of consent” as contractually regulated activities, attributing 
“harmonization of goals” and “mutuality” to an emerging set of relational norms, 
drawn together in an abstract process of “planning”.  Planning emphasizes an 
outcome, a written articulation of alignment goals (Corsaro and Snehota, 2012). 
Further refining these concepts, we found extensive phases of contract negotiation, 
taking as long as half the time allocated for the subsequent project.  We conclude that 
forming a contract is a business activity, and part of a structured and possibly intense 
interaction between business organizations that can either initiate new business 
relationships, or allow actors to step back from past relationships, reconfiguring these 
for a new project in anticipation of a new instance of interaction.  The contracting 
phase requires those preparing contracts to draw upon the contracting organizations’ 
technical expertise, applied to a new episode of interaction.  In this phase of preparing 
a contract, events in previous projects made them take precautions they deemed 
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appropriate.   
 
Once signed, the contract seems to acquire a stable quality, but as a resource can be 
deployed in multiple ways, which is in common with IMP researchers’ general 
understating of business resources (Baraldi, et al., 2012).   In the innovation cases 
under scrutiny caution pertained to a fair allocation of monetary and personnel costs 
and benefits. This ideal of balance was emphasized in all three projects, as the 
anticipated need for continuous refinement with the customer in the face of 
uncertainties were most likely to strain the subsequent exchanges. Even attributes of 
the relational norms as set out by Blois and Ivens (2007), reciprocity, role integrity, 
and flexibility, were built-in and enforced by an initial contractual safeguarding of 
exchange mechanisms.  The presumed initial mutuality is tied into the contract by this 
reconciliation of viewpoints and confidentiality agreement, the outcome of this 
intensive process, constituting an important ingredient for initiating a project.   
 
Gradually, a set of relational norms can take over although with the successful 
projects we examined, the contract became superseded by relational norms.  While we 
agree with Mouzas and Ford (2012) that a contract is used as a resource, we did not 
examine any umbrella agreements, so cannot comment on whether contracts can 
become a special kind of meta-resource.  The most mindful use of a contract, as a 
written document, was in a negative sense among one of the three projects, signifying 
a relative failure in establishing relational norms.   The relational norms emerged in 
two of the three projects through insensitive interaction among its participants – 
commencing with preparing a contract initially – allowing the smoothing-out of 
oscillations in the relationship life cycle scrutinized by Corsaro and Snehota (2012). 
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6.2 Managerial implications 
Managers should be aware of the multiple roles of contracts and the complementary 
beneficial effect the relational norms may have after the initiation of a project or other 
means of business exchange.  After the signature, we found the contract to assume its 
– legally enforced – stasis, a frozen status.  It is predominantly at this point that we 
observed the collaborations developing as specific relational norms set in. However, 
this attitudinal trait is not rigid either; the negotiations as to relational norms do not 
have an imposed end such as a signature.  Innovation strategists should see that it is 
by flexibility and the mutual preservation in the set of relational norms that partners 
support a development. We saw its greatest benefit in enabling renegotiations of the 
initial common goals – albeit legally tied into the project – in harmony without 
potential for lengthy disruptions or litigation. In this duality the relational contract 
persists beside the contract, but we saw the former recede quickly as unforeseen 
technical developments superseded its initial and common goals. 
 
6.3 Suggestion for further research  
Our research has two limitations.  The two best-functioning projects were within the 
IndSyst group, although that there were contracts qualifies any expectation of prior 
goal alignment.  Also, the contracts were not tested in a court, unlike with Harrison’s 
(2004) cases.  Nevertheless, our findings confirm the need for a greater emphasis on 
contracts as a resource both produced and used within industrial networks (Mouzas 
and Ford, 2012). Whereas the body of literature does not make a precise distinction 
between the process of contract generation and the fixed, signed, contract as a 
resource to be used for mediating a project or other exchange, we discovered a great 
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difference between these two understandings. This difference points to further insight 
into the complementary role of the set of relational norms, as approximating a 
relational contract, and deepen the understanding of uses of contracts in business-to-
business relationships.
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Table 1: Synopsis of the cross-case study 
 Case 1 Case 2  Case 3 
Description  Proof-of-concept for 
reliability prediction 
and resource flow in 
industrial equipment 
in full service 
Mobilisation of repair, 
maintenance and asset 
management for full 
service engineers 
Technical enabling of 
high process 
variability and 
decision support for 
asset and resource 
flow in full service  
Business 
units/ 
companies 
Several independent 
full service divisions 
across IndSyst 
 
 
Two large 
international full 
service divisions 
across IndSyst 
A full service division 
in IndSyst; three more 
companies, two think 
tanks, one IT chair in 
a University 
Degree of 
uncertainty 
of 
innovation 
High Medium High 
Contract 
frame 
Plc regulations; 
Company A internal 
regulations 
Plc regulations; 
Company A internal 
regulations 
German Commercial 
Code (HGB) 
regulations; Plc 
regulations 
  
Detailed 
formal 
agreement 
process 
Kickoff 
Two specifications 
documents 
Cross-divisional 
agreement  
Kickoff 
One specifications 
document 
Cross-divisional 
agreement 
Formal specification 
Tendering process 
Kickoff 
Umbrella agreement  
1 comprehensive 
requirement document 
Duration 2 years (2009-2011) 2 years (2009-2011) 3 years (2009-2012) 
Volume                     
in IndSyst 
€250,000 €300,000 €1,200,000 
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Table  2: Empirical work for the three cases, 2009-2012 
Kind of interaction Typical 
duration 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Technical 
presentations 
2 hours 4 hours 10 hours 2 hours 
Joint workshops 8 hours 8 hours 8 hours 44 hours 
Personal interviews ½ – 2 hours 5 hours 3 hours 14.5 hours 
Phone call ½ – 1 hour 6 hours 3 hours 47 hours 
Informal discussion 
with stakeholder 
½ – 1 hour 14 hours 5.5 hours 14 hours 
Research discussion 
with team 
2-3 hours 14 hours 7.5 hours 41 hours 
Evaluation of 
secondary materials 
 500 MB 400 MB 6 GB 
Network drawings 
obtained 
 5 4 11 
Repertory grid 
questionnaires 
 5 4 11 
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Table 3: Sequence of a full service manager’s perception of the input-
output balance in Project 2 
Product/Service Price Value  
 Service manager: we had this 
project “job" in addition to our 
routine work 
 
 The time my team put in the 
project we didn't have for 
reaching our revenue targets 
Committing this time was a 
burden  
 
 We made a lot of work for other 
service organizations implicitly 
 
The outcome was 
very promising 
 I clearly saw that it was 
what we needed here 
The outcome was 
the desired, tailor-
made mobilisation 
suite 
 My team still benefit from 
our pilot input 
The acceptance of the new 
suite in my team is 
particularly high 
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Table 4: Sequence on project decision in Project 3 
Product/Service Price Value  
 Would it pay off to invest in a 
harmonisation of graphical user 
interfaces? 
 
 The on-call coordinators would 
have to invest a lot of time to 
provide the needed 
specifications and feedback for 
this 
 
 How can we make the best of 
the project resources? 
 
Case-based 
decision 
algorithms are 
needed much more 
urgently 
 It will make much more 
sense to invest our common 
effort into case-based 
decision algorithms 
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Table 5: Sequence on perceived imbalance and disappointment 
Statements of customer (service unit) in Project 3 
 
Product/Service Price Value  
 Service unit: your (the 
supplier's) company is 
receiving several hundred 
man-months for this project  
 
 You keep asking for test 
cases and we provided 
everything we had 
 
Aren't you providing a 
comprehensive two-
way integration? 
 We won't see changes made 
to our customer data 
immediately 
  This way, the application 
will not constitute an 
improvement for our unit. 
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Table 6: Cross-case findings 
Characteristics Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Juridical frame Plc regulations, 
IntSyst internal 
regulations 
Plc regulations; 
IntSyst internal 
regulations 
German Commercial 
Code (HGB) 
regulations, Plc 
regulations 
Detailed 
formal 
agreement 
process 
Kickoff 
2 Requirement 
documents 
Cross-divisional 
agreement  
Kickoff 
1 Requirement 
document 
Cross-divisional 
agreement 
Formal specification 
Tendering process 
Kickoff 
Umbrella agreement  
1 comprehensive 
requirement 
document 
Formal goal(s) Either: technical 
evaluation and 
assessment of 
competitors' claims, 
or: sellable 
reliability prediction 
tool 
Sellable product Proof of concept and 
pilot for a sellable 
product  
Project climate Unitary Unitary Egoist 
  
Outcome Scientific 
evaluation of 
technical potential 
and founded 
refutation of 
competitor claims  
Sellable product  Punctual instances of 
proof-of-concept 
Participants' 
judgement on 
success 
Successful 
evaluation 
Successful 
innovation  
Failure 
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Table 7: Harmonizing the actor’s goals in a relational contract 
Construct Case 1 Case 2  Case 3 
Harmonisation 
of goals 
Goals were aligned 
from the outset, no 
one took advantage 
of others' temporal 
weaknesses 
Bilateral goals and a 
comprehensive 
mission effectively 
fostered goodwill 
The absence of a joint 
goal, evasive 
behaviour and the 
“free rider” problem 
hindered the relational 
contract 
Relational 
contract  
Positive throughout Positive and 
monotonously 
increasing despite a 
high work load 
A small positive in the 
beginning, declining 
near zero over time 
Sequence of 
contractual 
phases 
Formal – transition 
– relational  
Formal – transition 
– relational  
Formal – unilateral 
transition – formal  
Sequence of 
prevailing 
activities 
Contract negotiation 
– harmonisation – 
implementation – 
testing – 
information  
Contract negotiation 
– harmonisation – 
implementation – 
testing – product 
introduction 
Contract negotiation – 
input negotiation – 
workload discussions 
– regulation – 
withdrawal 
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